An Eye for an Eye and Our Shared Humanity – Mishpatim 5782

For the past few months, I have participated in an interfaith Bible study group, with several other Rabbis, Pastors, Priests and Teachers.

Our learning is based on a book called The Bible with and without Jesus, by Amy-Jill Levine and Marc Zvi Brettler. The basic premise is that both Judaism and Christianity rely upon the same sacred Hebrew Scriptures, but interpret and implement them very differently.

These differing interpretations have led to deep misunderstandings over the centuries and have served as the basis for many of the classic antisemitic tropes of the past millenia.

As luck would have it, it was my turn to co-facilitate our discussion this past week, with the chapter in the book that we discussed coming from this morning’s Torah portion.

Before I get to that, I’d like to share a conversation I had with my daughter Noa a few days ago.  We were discussing the term the “Judeo-Christian Tradition” and trying to understand what it actually meant. From her perspective, whenever she heard the term, it did not really reflect her own experience and understanding of Judaism; and I have to say that I agreed with her.

What does it mean? It implies that there is a core set of shared values introduced by Judaism and then extended by Christianity. These values serve as the foundation of Western ethics.

But I had no clue where the expression comes from.

Enter Rabbi Wikipedia.

The first ever reference appeared in an 1821 letter and referred to Jews who had converted to Christianity. An 1829 reference used it to descrive a Church that had deliberately embraced some Jewish rituals so that it would better appeal to Jews. That’s not very good for us.

The earliest reference in something like the way we understand it today seems to have been in 1939. George Orwell referred to “the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals.” This followed a lot of work that had taken place in the 1930’s to emphasize common ground between Christians and Jews so as to combat antisemitism and anti-Catholicism in the United States. 

The term gradually morphed into political use during the Cold War to contrast the ethics-based system of Western democracies with Communism. 

In 1952, President Eisenhower, one month before his inauguration, became the first President to invoke the term when he said, extemporaneously,

[The Founding Fathers said] ‘we hold that all men are endowed by their Creator … ‘ In other words, our form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is. With us of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept, but it must be a religion with all men created equal.

One of my problems with the term is that it tends to over-emphasize shared values without recognizing that, in fact, there are some pretty profound differences. For example, it might focus on shared central texts like the Ten Commandments without acknowledging how differently each of our traditions might consider them.

In our group, we are learning how our respective traditions understand the same texts through completely different lenses.  Often, the Christian interpretation and the Rabbinic interpretations of central passages in the Hebrew Bible are in direct contradiction of one another.

Learning together, and openly addressing some of the passages that have historically been kind of thorny, has been a great way to increase mutual understanding as well as learn more about our own tradition.

Now we turn to this week’s Torah portion.  Among the many laws presented in Parashat Mishpatim, we encounter this one. Don’t get distracted by the first part.

When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning. But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.

Exodus 21:22-26

This is a strange combination of legal principles. We start with a discussion of an accidentally, but violently, induced miscarriage. Then, we are suddenly talking about “life for life, eye for eye,” and so on.

There are two other occasions in the Torah in which the “eye for an eye” principle appears.  Once in Leviticus, and again in Deuteronomy. Both of them appear in different contexts. This leads us to assume that, when it came to personal injury cases, this was a governing legal principle in ancient Israel.

This legal principle is referred to in Latin as Lex Talionis, which means “law of retaliation.” talionis – retaliation

At first glance, to modern readers, this might seem bloodthirsty and vengeful. Indeed, it has been used as justification for antisemitism for millenia. Jews are overly focused on law rather than mercy. Think of the character of Shylock in the Merchant of Venice demanding his pound of flesh. 

But the truth is quite the opposite.

To gain some understanding of what this principle meant, we need to consider the society in which it came to be, and also consider how Jewish tradition has understood and applied it.

The oldest human record we have dates back to the 18th century BCE Babylonian Code of Hammurabi.  Hammurabi establishes an underlying principle of proportionality, the purpose of which was to ensure, first of all, that retaliation did not get out of hand, and secondly, that a higher class perpetrator did not get off scot-free. The innovation here is that the state took upon itself the authority to regulate and standardize payments for injuries.

In a world in which the blood feud is so tempting—think the Montagues vs. the Capulets—an “eye for an eye” limits retaliation to only an “eye for an eye.”

Here are a few examples from the Code of Hammurabi:

If an awilu, an upper-class free person should blind the eye of another awilu, they shall blind his eye.

If he should break the bone of another awilu, they shall break his bone.

If he should blind the eye of a commoner or break the bone of a commoner, he shall weigh an deliver one-half of his value (in silver).

The Torah takes this a step further.  It does not draw any distinction between the poor and the wealthy.  In Leviticus, it is clear that it applies to Israelite citizens and resident aliens alike. The law of proportionality applies equally to all. This is consistent with the Torah’s general concern with the dignity of the human being, made in God’s image.

Think of the numerous times in which the Torah forbids favoring one side over the other in a court case, or warnings against judges taking bribes, or having a single law that is administered fairly to everyone.

An eye for an eye was an incredibly egalitarian innovation—we could say improvement—over the Code of Hammurabi.

What we do not know is how an “eye for an eye” was actually practiced in ancient Israel. Was it taken literally, as in if I poked your eye out than you would poke my eye out; or was it figurative, as in if I poked your eye out, I had to pay you the value of your eye in compensation?

We just do not have any evidence, and the Bible does not include any examples of it being implemented in practice. For a religion that put such a high value on human dignity, emphasizing that every human being was created in God’s image, it does seem hard to believe that the legal system would intentionally cause the defacement of the human form.

The Rabbis of the Talmud, however, tell us exactly how they understand an “eye for an eye”: it means monetary payment. 

The Talmud goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the Torah itself, when it requires an eye for an eye, means the value of an eye rather than the actual eye itself.

It goes through many creative midrashic attempts to prove it, but then finds cause to reject each of them in turn.  In the end, there is no conclusive proof, but of course that does not prevent the Rabbis of the Talmud from interpreting it in this way.

In the course of their discussions, they raise numerous practical and ethical problems with a literal interpretation. For example, they imagine a case in which someone who is blind causes another person to become blind. Or someone missing a limb causes another person to lose a limb. How could we then fulfill the Torah’s literal principle of “an eye for an eye?”

Furthermore, what good does it do the injured party to have their attacker lose and eye or a limb?  It does not help the victim’s situation at all other than possibly satisfying some urge for vengeance.

The Mishnah establishes, again based on close, creative textual reading, that a person who injures another is liable for five categories of damages:

  1. the injury itself
  2. pain and suffering
  3. medical costs
  4. loss of income
  5. the indignity or embarrassment that the injury caused

Because the injury cannot be taken back, monetary compensation is the best that can be done. For better or for worse, it is how human beings assign value. 

Rather than being an overly legalistic, merciless application of justice, “an eye for an eye” was a major step forward, in practice, of upholding the equal dignity of every human being.

The Rabbis’ wisdom was in understanding that every person’s situation is different, and we must do the best we can to pursue justice at every opportunity, recognizing that we are imperfect, but faithful in the belief that, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, whose birthday we celebrated a couple of weeks ago, “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”

Being able to speak with each other honestly about where our differences in interpretation are might lead us to find, not necessarily common ground in how we understand these texts, but common ground in our shared humanity.

Casting Truth to the Earth – Bereshit 5782

At the end of day six of creation, all but one thing has come into existence by the word of God.  And so God declares: 

נַֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה אָדָ֛ם בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ כִּדְמוּתֵ֑נוּ

“Shall we make humanity according to our form and likeness?”

Who is this “we?” Does God have a design committee?  Perhaps it is the “royal we?” The text is silent. So the midrash tells a story to answer the question.

When it comes time for the Holy Blessed One to create humanity, the ministering angels break off into factions and groupings.  Some of them say yibarei! Let humanity be created!  While others declare Al yibarei!  Don’t let them be created!

A verse in Psalms alludes to this epic argument:

חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת נִפְגָּשׁוּ צֶדֶק וְשָׁלוֹם נָשָׁקוּ

“Kindness and truth met, justice and peace kissed.” (Psalm 85:11)

But this was no meeting of friends, no kiss of love.  It was combat – pure and simple, with the fate of humanity in the balance.

Chesed, kindness, stands up and proclaims “Let humanity be created, for they will perform countless acts of gemilut chasadim, of lovingkindness.”

Then Emet, Truth, rises to object, “Don’t do it!  They will all be liars!”

Tzedek, Righteousness, takes his turn and declares “Let them be created, for they will give untold sums of tzedakah!”

Finally, Shalom, peace, steps forward and laments, “Let them not be created, for they will be full of violence!”

The arguments fly back and forth between the angels.  “Let them be created!”  “Don’t let them be created!” Nobody can convince the other.

So what does the Holy Blessed One do? God grabs Emet, Truth, and casts her to the ground.

Stunned, the angels look up at God and ask, “How can you treat your seal in this way?” For Truth is the seal of God.  “Let Truth rise back up from the ground!”

And then the angels turn back to each other, and the arguing breaks out again, even louder and more heated than before.

While they are otherwise engaged, God quietly sneaks out the back and creates the first human. God returns to the angels, shows them the new creation, and says “Why are you guys still arguing. Behold: humanity.”

According to this midrash, we should not read it as Na’aseh Adam (נַֽעֲשֶׂ֥ה אָדָ֛ם) – “Shall we make humanity?” but rather Na’asah Adam נַֽעֲשָׂה אָדָ֛ם – Humanity has been made in our form and our likeness.  It is not a question that God asks the angels.  It is a report, after the fact. A fait accomplis.

I love this midrash on so many levels.  It expresses the moral complexity of being human. We can be wonderful to each other, left one another up with kindness and restore each other’s dignity.  But we fight and argue. We deceive one another and behave as if we are always in competition. This is our struggle, as individuals and as a species.

The midrash also depicts a fight, a stalemate – in which nobody can convince each other of their point of view.  When we cannot agree on the truth, it is impossible to see things from another point of view, to compromise, to find common ground. To break the tie sometimes requires letting go of our need to be right. So God casts truth to the earth. It can sprout again, but only if it is fed by righteousness and kindness.

Finally, the image of God sneaking out the back to go create humanity while the angels fight is just wonderful. How often does our need to win hold us back from ever moving forward in positive direction?

Cash Bail in Jewish Law – Shoftim 5778

Of the many problems that California is currently facing, bail reform is one that has recently been in the news.

That is because there is a bill, SB10, that has been going through the California State Assembly and is going to be up for a vote this week after numerous modifications over the past year.

The latest version represents a compromise that does not please everyone.  The law would eliminate the cash bail system.  Instead, each county’s court system would determine whether to incarcerate an accused criminal based on a pre-trial assessment of whether a person would be a risk to society or pose a flight risk.

If SB10 passes the Assembly, it will still need to clear the State Senate and then be signed by the Governor.

Let me state at the outset that I do not know whether this law will solve the problem.  But the problem certainly needs solving.

Even though all of us are experts on the judicial system due to our careful viewing of Law & Order, please allow me to review a few details.

Bail is the release from custody of an accused person before the trial.  

It originated in England in medieval times as a way to make sure that a suspect would show up in court.  It does not necessarily involve the payment of money.

Cash bail, which SB10 would eliminate, means that the court requires the accused to come up with a certain amount of money in order to be released.  If the money is not raised, then the accused remains incarcerated through the end of the trial.  If the money is raised, the accused is released on bail, with the money being returned after the trial is complete, minus fees. 

In the 8th Amendment, the Founding Fathers included the clause – “Excessive bail shall not be required.”  The Supreme Court has never determined what “Excessive” means.

Under current federal law, certain crimes are not subject to bail.  Suspects must be kept in jail before the trial.  This includes cases in which there might be a sentence of death or life in prison, certain drug offenses, and a few other categories.  A judge who determines that a suspect would pose a risk to his/her community or be a flight risk can also deny bail.

For all other crimes, there is a bail hearing.  Most states use the cash bail system.  Accused persons who are unable to afford the bail amount face a choice.  In states where it is legal, like California, they can go to a bail bond agency, which loans them the money in exchange for a payment, usually 10% of the total bail amount.  The bail bondsman then makes sure that the accused shows up in court.

A person who cannot afford the bail bond must remain in jail, even though bail has been granted.

There are a number of problems with the cash bail system.

Keep in mind, first of all, that under American law a suspect is innocent until proven guilty.  This means that when a person accused of a crime who is kept in jail, he is kept there as a legally innocent person.

The median bail amount in California is $50,000.  Only 1 in 10 can afford to pay it.  63% of those who are currently sitting in jail have not been convicted of anything.  They are waiting for trial or sentencing.  A person who is in jail awaiting trial is unable to work.  He (it is usually a he) typically loses his job, and possibly his home.  He is unable to support his family.  He has great difficulty meeting with his legal team and preparing his defense.

In contrast, a person who has the means to post bail can continue to work and has a much easier time of meeting with his lawyer and preparing his case.  The result is that for those convicted of the same crime, those who post bail, on average, receive a lesser sentence than those who have to remain in jail before the trial.

There is evidence, as well, that bail rates for black and Hispanic defendants are set higher than for white defendants who are charged with the same crime.

Finally, the prospect of spending a long time in jail awaiting trial encourages innocent people to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit.  This gets them out of jail, but it also gives them a criminal record, which can have a lifetime impact.

SB10 tries to address these issues.  As the bill itself states:

It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to safely reduce the number of people detained pretrial, while addressing racial and economic disparities in the pretrial system, and to ensure that people are not held in pretrial detention simply because of their inability to afford money bail. (SB10, Sec. 2)

I do not know whether SB10 will achieve these goals.  I am trying to learn more about it, but am certainly no expert.  I encourage all of us to educate ourselves on this issue.

When trying to understand an issue of criminal reform, it can be helpful to look at other systems.  While not perfect, our Jewish legal tradition is rooted in principles of fairness and equity.  It turns out that Jewish law, or halakhah, has something to say about bail as well.

This morning’s Torah portion, Shoftim, is primarily about the justice system.  Moses instructs the Israelites, collectively, to establish and maintain just institutions of government.  In the second verse.  Regarding judges, he declares:

Lo tateh mishpat, lo takir panim, lo tikach shochad ki hashochad ye’aver einei chakhamim visalef divrei tzadikim.

You shall not skew judgment.  You shall recognize no face and no bribe shall you take, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and perverts the words of the innocent.  (Deut. 16:19)

These are the three principles of judicial fairness.  They appear numerous times in the Torah.  Usually, the Torah addresses them to judges specifically.  Here, Moses delivers these requirements to the Israelites collectively, as if to say that we all bear responsibility for the behavior of soceity’s officials.  We must make sure that those whom we appoint as justices and magistrates abide by principles of equality and fairness.

These three concepts present three aspects of judicial fairness.

Jewish law recognizes that judges are human beings.  A judge may not do anything in the court that would show favor to a wealthy person or an acquaintance.  Not only is a judge not allowed to take a bribe, for obvious reasons, a court is not allowed to charge fees to the plaintiffs in a case.  Mishnah Bechorot (4:6) states that “anyone who charges a fee to the litigants to judge – his judgment is nullified.”

The judge cannot allow anything to occur in the courtroom that might prevent a plaintiff from presenting the best possible case.

The judicial system the Torah describes is fairly uncomplicated.  In a real legal system, however, there are a lot more moving parts.  It is not difficult to imagine a flawed court that is comprised of well-intentioned, knowledgeable professionals of high moral character.

Regarding bail, the Talmud (BT Sanhedrin 78b) deals explicitly with the question of what to do with a suspect before the trial is held.  If it is a capital crime – in other words if the accused has been charged with murder – he must be jailed by the court until guilt or innocence can be determined.  In such a case, no bail is permitted.  If the accused has severely injured a person, and it is not clear if the victim will survive, he is also held in jail.  The reason is because the court does not yet know if he will need to be tried for murder or for injury.  Rashi explains that the accused is imprisoned out of a concern for flight-risk.  If the suspect injures another, but the injuries are not considered to be life-threatening, then he is released until the trial.  

The Mekhilta (Mishpatim, Ex. 21:19, 2), an early legal midrash collection on the book of Exodus, addresses the question of cash bail directly.  In the situation described in the Talmud, the accused is not permitted to post bail and go free.  He must remain incarcerated until the victim’s fate resolves.  

An entry under “Bail” in the 1906 Jewish Encyclopedia concludes as follows:

…as a rich man can readily give Bail and the poor man can not, the release of the prisoner on Bail would run counter to that other oft-repeated rule of the Torah, ‘One law there shall be to you.'”

Over the centuries, Jewish law has not traditionally employed incarceration as a punishment in the legal system.  It was basically used just for holding an accused murderer before trial out of concern for public safety and potential flight.

There are essentially three types of punishments that a Jewish court can administer.  For capital crimes, the punishment is death.  For sins, the court can administer lashes.  For civil and personal injury cases, there are fines.

One form of imprisonment that is mentioned in ancient sources is called the kippah.  It was a small cell in which a person would be imprisoned and fed meager rations until he died.  This could be used in a case in which a murderer was found guilty, but could not be sentenced to death because of a technicality.  There is no evidence that the kippah was ever actually used, though.

Dina d’malkhuta dina is an ancient concept that is applied in particular to monetary laws.  “The law of the land is the law.”  In order to participate in the economies of the societies in which they live, Jews need to adopt those society’s laws, including when they do not conform to Jewish law.

For most of the past two thousand years, Rabbis did not have the authority to issue legal rulings except in cases that were internal to the Jewish community.  Many of the discussions on criminal and civil law, therefore, are theoretical.  But there is a historical record of a cash bail system being utilized by a Jewish court.

Rabbi Yitzchak ben Sheshet Perfet, known by his acronym as the Rivash, was a 14th century Spanish Rabbi.  He wrote a teshuvah, a legal decision, that deals with a question of whether a debtor who could not pay off his debts could be incarcerated.  He rules that this would be forbidden under Jewish law.  But then he laments:

The truth is, in my own city, the judges’ custom is to imprison a person who is liable in this manner, according to an act of the community.  And they further enacted that even without being found guilty, any person can be held over a lawsuit, unless they pay collateral, and they call this a ruling of the court.  I did not want to allow this act to stand, because it is not in accordance with our Torah’s law.  And they said to me: this is in accordance with the “marketplace act” [a principle allowing new rules that make commerce smoother], because of swindlers, and so as not to bar the door in the face of borrowers. And I allowed their custom to stand. (Teshuvot HaRivash 484) 

In other words, in the Rivash’s day, Rabbinic courts were sending Jews to debtors prison and allowing them to post bail.  This was apparently the dominant practice in the area, and was deemed necessary by the leaders of the Jewish community to preserve the integrity of the marketplace.  Knowing that it was against the Torah, the Rivash reluctantly allowed it to stand.

The existence of the modern State of Israel has made the question of how to punish criminals in a Jewish legal system practical.  

Rabbi Haim David HaLevy, the former Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, who died in 1988, wrote a Tehuvah in which he stated categorically that a person who is being charged for a capital crime should be incarcerated without bail under any circumstance.  Citing the Rivash, he concludes that “that for all other crimes, for which the punishment is monetary, we let them go [on bail] until the determination of the sentence.”  (Aseh L’kha Rav 3:48)

Like any legal system, Jewish law is not perfect.  Nevertheless, for more than three thousand years, it has strived to conform to principles of justice and equity that are rooted in the Torah itself.  As such, it has something to teach us today.

I would never suggest that state or federal law must conform to Jewish law.  We Jews should be nervous whenever a religious group tries to impose its beliefs on secular law.

But our ancient tradition has much to teach us concerning the establishment of societies and institutions that are guided by justice and equality.  We would be wise to improve our understanding of Jewish law as we try to determine the best way forward for our community, our state, and our nation.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Incarceration in Jewish Law: A Brief Overview

10 things you need to know about money bail

The Shemitah Ideal: Forego Profit and Renounce Ownership – Parashat Behar 5776

Parashat Behar presents the laws of shemitah, the sabbatical year.  The Israelites are allowed to plant and sow, prune and gather for six years.  Then, on the seventh year, the land is to be given a sabbath of complete rest.  No cultivation can take place, but people are allowed to consume whatever happens to grow on its own.  The Torah explains that when the laws of shemitah are followed, the sixth year will produce such abundant crops that there will be plenty of food to go around for the next two years.

Another aspect of shemitah required indentured servants to be set free during the seventh year.  There were elements of the shemitah system in effect during years one through six as well.  Landowners had to give ma’aser oni, 10% of their crops to the poor every 3rd and 6th year.  They had to allow the poor to come on to their fields to harvest the corners and gleanings every year.

Maimonides identifies two separate mitzvot, commandments, pertaining to shemitah (Hilchot Shemitah v’Yovel 1:1, 4:24).  1.  It is a positive commandment to suspend work on the land and cultivation of trees.  2.  It is a positive commandment to release all agricultural produce.  In other words, farmers are not allowed to put up barriers around their fields, vineyards, and orchards.  Their property must be open to the public.  Furthermore, Maimonides adds, farmers are not allowed to gather in excess produce into their homes.  Small quantities can be brought in.  But for the most part, everyone is supposed to have equal access to the produce that happens to grow during the shemitah year.

In his Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides suggests two reasons for the shemitah requirements.  The first is that these laws promote sympathy for our fellow human beings.  The second is that by letting the land lie fallow on the seventh year, it will result in greater overall production.

Regarding the second reason, Maimonides is wrong.  Farmers have practiced crop rotation since ancient times.  Without going into specifics, simply letting land remain uncultivated once every seven years is not crop rotation.  Many other commentators specifically repudiate Maimonides for suggesting this.

Most agree with Maimonides, however, regarding his first explanation.  Sixteenth century Italian Rabbi Abraham Porto writes, for example:

This law was given in order that we may show sympathy for our fellow men who have neither land nor vineyards, and that they may be happy in the Shemitah year, as the rich are happy every year.  (Minchah Belulah)

Another commentator explains that

the suspension of work in every seventh year causes us to realize that our mission on earth is not to be slaves to the soil but a much higher and nobler one.  Work should only serve the purpose of providing food and other needs, while our task is to attain to the supreme end…  (Akedat Yitzchak)

Think about what it would be like to be an Israelite landowner in a society that observes Shemitah.  I have to stop all work on the land.  I cannot even allow my non-Israelite workers to do anything.  I have to take down any fences or barriers around my fields.  As for produce that happens to grow naturally, I am not allowed to harvest it.  Instead, it remains in the ground, on the tree, or on the vine.

When I need food, I can go out to my field.  But I will be joining everyone else from my community when I do so.  The poor, the strangers, the property-less Levites.  All of us have equal access to the lands that I once thought of us as mine.

For one year, all social and economic differences are set aside.  The wealthy stand side by side with their servants, the poor, and the strangers among them.  Just think about the impact on social interactions if our society followed an institution like shemitah – to forego profit and renounce ownership.

Perhaps this is a utopian socialist ideal – but remember that it is only once every seven years.  The Torah recognizes the inherent competitive nature of humanity.  Rather than try to suppress it, it asks us instead to harness it.

We desperately need this ethic here in California, where we are living the opposite of the shemitah ideal.

There is an unprecedented housing crisis in our state.  The cause of this housing crisis is not a secret: income inequality.

This week, the Mercury News reported the following statistics:  Home ownership rates statewide are at the lowest level since the 1940’s.  The median price of a home in Santa Clara County is $1,070,000.  To qualify for a mortgage for such a home, a homebuyer would need an annual income of $219,870.  Assuming the homebuyer made a down payment of 20%, the resulting payment on a 30-year fixed rate loan would be $5,500 per month.

So many people struggle to meet even their basic housing needs; the idea of taking off a year to pursue more spiritual matters is a pipe dream.

Our society is structured in such a way that people of different economic levels are separated from one another.  There is not a whole lot of social interaction taking place between blue collar and white collar workers.

These kinds of inequalities are precisely what Shemitah addresses.  The walls between us, quite literally, come down.  The pursuit of wealth is put on hold.  Rich and poor, executives and janitors, stand shoulder to shoulder as they pick food for themselves and their families.  And everyone uses their time to pursue spiritual matters: the study of Torah, the development of relationships, the cultivation of compassion.

Rav Kook, the early religious Zionist in the early twentieth century, wrote a book about shemitah called Shabbat HaAretz. – the Sabbath of the Land.  You can hear the idealism in his beautiful words as he imagines Jews living in harmony in with each other and the land.

It is a year of equality and rest, in which the soul reaches out towards divine justice, towards God Who sustains the living creatures with loving kindness.  There is no private property and no punctilious privilege but the peace of God reigns over all in which there is the breath of life…  Sanctity is not profaned by the exercise of private acquisitiveness over all this year’s produce, and the covetousness of wealth stirred up by commerce is forgotten.

Bibliography

Nehama Leibowitz, New Studies in Vayikra, pp. 509-522